In this paper, we use a unique matched worker-workplace dataset to estimate the effect on own earnings of co-workers' education. Our results, using the 1998 GB Workplace Employee Relations Survey, show significant effects. Own earnings premia from own education fall slightly because of an independent, significantly positive effect from average workplace education. We also test for interactions between own and co-worker education levels. However, these interactions appear negative: own education is valued less highly at workplaces where co-workers' education levels are already high. This result runs counter to our theoretical prediction, and suggests that workers compete in tournaments for high-paying jobs.
1.

Introduction
The strongly positive influence of education on earnings is one of the most intensively tested relationships in economics (Lazear, 2000) . There is also a sizeable literature identifying educational externalities, i.e. spillover benefits from educated individuals to others (Wolfe and Zuvekas, 2000) . However, there is surprisingly little evidence on whether these spillover effects obtain within the workplace, and what effect these might have on own earnings. In particular, there is no clear indication as to whether educated co-workers raise or lower own earnings.
Given the beneficial effects of education for the individual, positive spillovers might be expected. Co-workers' human capital may positively influence own wages through several routes: for instance, Idson and Kahane (2000) refer to a 'team dynamic'. If such benefits exist, co-workers may share their human capital, to mutually raise productivity and so raise wages. However, co-workers' human capital need not be complementary to own human capital. If workers are in competition with each other for high-paying jobs within the workplace, they may engage in 'sabotage' activities to undermine their co-workers and promote themselves (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller, 1997) . If co-workers have high education levels, there is a higher probability they are over-educated, leading to lower job satisfaction and less 'team spirit' (see Oosterbeek, 2000) . In addition, if co-workers have different amounts of human capital, then there may be a 'skills incompatibility' problem (Kremer, 1993) .
A workplace with a uniform standard of education may have higher productivity than one where both average education levels and the spread of education levels are high.
Thus, both the amounts and the distribution of workplace human capital are likely to influence an individual's earnings. Although it is anticipated that the spillovers will dominate the sabotage effects, the directions of these influences should be assessed empirically. This paper tests for human capital interactions directly, using random samples of workers from workplaces in Great Britain. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the possible externalities from co-worker human capital are discussed, along with the pertinent (but mainly indirect) evidence. This discussion allows for formulation of testable hypotheses about the effects on earnings.
In Section 3 the dataset -the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (1998) -is described and evaluated. In Section 4, the effects of workplace education on own earnings are tested. In Section 5, a summary and conclusion is offered.
Theory and Evidence on Human Capital Spillovers
Returns to Human Capital Within the Workplace
The literature on the earnings premia from education is vast (see Ashenfelter et al., 2000) . Broadly, this cross-sectional, correlational literature indicates that in Western economies the wage premium for each additional year of education is approximately 5-10% (for the UK, see Blundell et al., 2000) . Moreover, this premium is not substantially altered when the endogenous decision to become educated is modelled (e.g., from twins studies or natural experiments, Miller et al., 1997; Harmon and Walker, 1995) . The impact of own education on own productivity and earnings is strong and robust. Broadly, this literature indicates that education is a good proxy for human capital and skills in the workforce (although see Bowles and Gintis, 2000) .
But workers do not generally work autonomously, such that own productivity may also depend on the education of co-workers within the workplace. Many tasks require group work, with skills diffused through teams and across the workplace; and organisational cultures (e.g. those associated with high-performance management) may depend on the average skill level of the workforce. Furthermore, workplaces may deliberately cultivate a 'team dynamic', with information-sharing, co-training, monitoring, and support so as to exploit these spillovers. Idson (1995) , for example, looks at how earnings are correlated with production in teams, as well as with behavioural traits such as team size, encouragement and helpfulness. Equally strong effects may emerge from information-sharing, from skill complementarity, from informal training by co-workers (Barron et al., 1997) , or from more 'rational'
behaviour (Behrman and Stacey, 1997) .
The notion of positive human capital spillovers gains support from the substantial literature on the societal externalities from education (Wolfe and Zuvekas, 2000; Taylor, 1999) . Firms may even be able to generate more externalities than exist in societies, insofar as they can enforce tighter contracts across workers. The possibility of positive spillovers is at least indirectly suggested by evidence such as the positive clustering of high-skilled professionals with high-skilled nonprofessionals in the US (Bronars and Famulari, 1997) , the positive earnings effect from increasing proportions of skilled workers in a workplace (Troske, 1999) , and from sports performances, where team dynamics clearly occur (Idson and Kahane, 2000) . 1 As well, there is a positive correlation between all individuals' earnings and the average education level of a region (Rauch, 1993) ; a 'brain drain' of educated workers to areas where there are other educated workers (Borjas et al., 1992) ; and substantial unexplained firm-level heterogeneity in earnings (see Bayard and Troske, 1999; Abowd et al., 1999) . 2 Human capital spillover effects may therefore exist such that working with others who have high education levels may independently raise own earnings.
In contradistinction, co-worker human capital may have negative spillovers if there are intra-workplace job tournaments (as emphasized in the theoretical literature, e.g. Singh and Wittman, 2001 ). Where workers with equivalent skills compete for promotions, they are unlikely to share their human capital via team-playing. More likely, they may sabotage each other, and possibly this will reduce productivity overall. Furthermore, many workers do not have the optimal amount of education for their jobs (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000) . For Britain, over-education is significant and substantive: years of surplus education only weakly affect individual earnings, and they negatively affect job satisfaction (Battu et al., 1999) . If workers have accumulated more education than is optimal, any externalities may be subverted: an over-educated worker, with lower job satisfaction, may distract or demoralise other workers. Monitoring costs may be pushed up, to avoid workers who adroitly perform the set tasks then distracting co-workers. So although co-workers' years of education may boost earnings, where these are surplus years of education they may impair own earnings. For example, Tsang (1987) , with data from the Bell Company, finds overeducation reduces firm output via a negative effect on job satisfaction. Other indirect evidence on the effect of the human capital mix includes the negative effect of proportions of unskilled or manual workers on firm performance (Addison and 1 Macro-economic models and endogenous growth models draw on the notion of 'production externalities', with economic growth boosted through more efficient social capital investments (Romer, 1994) . 2 In an unpublished study, Barth (2000) directly tests the effects on co-worker earnings using two types of matched employer-employee data from Norway: an independent effect on own pay from the average level of education within an establishment ranges from 1% to 4% per year of average Belfield, 2001 ). 3 A final possibility is that spillover effects are appropriated by managers in terms of higher profits, rather than co-workers. This last effect seems unlikely though since highly educated workers would probably be the most effective at bargaining for higher shares of the workplace surplus and excessive appropriation would undermine the 'team dynamic'.
As a further extension, own earnings may be affected by the dispersion of human capital within the workplace. In some respects, this line of argument runs counter to the notion of human capital spillovers. In Kremer's (1993) o-ring theory the productivity of high-skilled workers is increasing in the skill levels of co-workers.
However, the o-ring theory also predicts that an important determinant of factor payments is the compatibility of standards: where workers are of a 'compatible standard', i.e. can exchange ideas and 'work together', they will earn more. Perhaps training programs are easier to implement (Barron et al., 1997; van Smoorenberg and van der Velden, 2000) , or there are fewer co-ordination or communication failures in standardised workplaces. This reasoning suggests an increase in education levels within the workplace may not raise earnings if it also serves to widen the dispersion of education levels, but that earnings will be raised where high-skilled workers cluster together.
Thus, there are plausible arguments on both sides, regarding the complementarity or substitutability of workers' human capital within a workplace;
and it is necessary to adjust for the spread of human capital. Empirical inquiry is then education. In contrast, Groshen (1991) finds that education levels very weakly reduce establishment wage differentials. 3 Yet, across the workplace, over-education may be minimal: either the employee mix could be adjusted so that over-educated and under-educated workers compensate for each other, or physical capital intensities may be varied. However, over-educated workers may guide or assist co-workers who only have the required education and it may be under-educated workers who are less competent, need greater monitoring or require more co-worker support (Tsang et al., 1993). necessary to test the competing arguments, but the empirical investigation has broader implications. If such spillovers are important and positive, and there is clustering of education levels within workplaces, then the earnings premium to education should be re-interpreted. The earnings premium is typically attributed to human capital and not to labor market sorting of workers according to their credentials (see Belfield, 2000 ).
Yet, part of the premium may be a consequence of educated workers being hired to workplaces where the average education level is high. These workers then 'share' their human capital and so have higher earnings. Education still enhances productivity and so earnings, but part of that enhancement comes from education's role in securing for a given worker a job which allows for interaction with other skilled workers. Similarly, the benefits of on-the-job increases in human capital may be greater than simple increases in the trainees' wages.
Model Specification
The above arguments can be modelled formally. An appropriate specification of the relationship between own earnings and co-worker attributes is laid out by Idson and Kahane (2000):
In equation (1), own individual earnings y ij are determined by: the education e ij of individual i at workplace j; the education levels of co-workers E j ; and the interaction between these two education levels e ij *E j . A vector of worker and workplace controls z ij and Z j are also included (v j~N (0, σ j ) and u i~N (0, σ i ) are iid workplace and individual error terms). Under this specification, an additional year of an individual worker's own education affects their earnings by α 2 + α 4 E j . The coefficient α 2 captures the direct effect of years of education, and the coefficient α 4 captures the effect of average co-worker education on how own education is valued. As well, an additional cross-workplace increase in education of one year will increase own earnings by α 3 + α 4 e ij . Co-worker education will impact directly through the coefficient estimated as α 3 , and indirectly through the interaction coefficient α 4. Here, if α 3 is non-zero, then omission of E serves to bias upwards α 2 , the standard measure of the education premium. The expectation is that α 3 and α 4 will be positive, although as noted above only limited evidence is available on each of these coefficients.
Where α 3 is positive, own earnings are positively enhanced by co-workers' education,
i.e. positive spillovers exist. Where α 4 is positive, increased years of co-worker education raise wages for those with high education levels, i.e. own and co-worker human capital are complementary. In addition, the importance of workers being compatible at working together is investigated. One approach is to include the absolute mean dispersion of education levels É j in an earnings equation. Greater dispersion of workplace education, controlling for e, should reduce own earnings. As an alternative general test to capture non-linear effects, the square of workplace human capital E j 2 is included in an earnings equation; if there are increasing returns to coworkers' education the coefficient for this parameter will be positive.
In summary, the following hypotheses are offered. First, workplace education levels raise own earnings. Second, co-worker human capital effects are stronger in high-skilled workplaces ('increasing returns to human capital' or complementarity).
Third, the dispersion of workplace education levels lowers earnings ('skills incompatibility'). It is possible to test each of these hypotheses using matched worker-workplace data.
3.
Data and Measures
To test the hypotheses, the dataset used is the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), collected in 1998 (DTI, 1999) . The WERS is a national sample of interviews with managers from 2,191 British establishments with at least ten workers (these establishments are workplaces which may be part of larger firms or enterprises). The establishment-level survey addresses the 'management of employees', with information on workforce composition and workplace performance (see Cully et al., 2000) . In addtion, 25 employees at each workplace were randomly selected for individual survey. This survey asked questions about individuals' education, pay and job satisfaction, as well as a range of personal characteristics. The information set is therefore rich, with detailed information on multiple workers per workplaces. For estimation, the sample here is restricted to full-time workers (i.e., those most likely to interact with others), and to workplaces where more than three workers responded to the worker survey. This yields information on 18,304 workers across 1,389 workplaces.
The derivation of the key variables is briefly described here; a full derivation is reported in Appendix Table 1 , along with a catalogue of substitute derivations of the key variables. The simplest way to estimate these relationships is to use years of education as the unit of account. 4 First, each workers' full-time equivalent years of education were calculated, to obtain e i ; these calculations were based on reported qualifications. (As human capital may not translate readily into years of education, full sensitivity analysis is conducted below). Second, workplace education levels E j were derived. Based on the full worker sample (reported by the manager for the entire workforce), mean years of education per occupation are calculated. This mean can then be weighted for each workplace, using information on the occupational mix of the entire workforce at each workplace. (Two alternative measures of mean workplace education are available, and these are utilized in the sensitivity testing).
Third, the dispersion of workplace education levels É j is also calculated where this dispersion measure is the average of absolute differences between own education (across the random sample of workers) and mean workplace education. Fourth, pay levels y ij are taken from individual workers' self-reports (across 12 wage bands), and converted into earnings per hour using the reports of hours worked. Median pay across the workplace Y j is also available; this variable is based on the distribution of pay across the workforce, as reported by the manager.
Basic frequencies for the key variables are reported in workplace, these workers were randomly sampled, and the average workplace only has 45 workers. Furthermore, the detailed information on both workers and workplaces in the WERS -essential for investigating these arguments -is unique for the British economy.
Estimation and Results
The main hypothesis is whether earnings are increasing in the education levels of coworkers. Table 2 reports a series of Mincerian log pay per hour equations, estimated with both own and co-worker levels of education. As per equation (1) Though the premium to own education is reduced, the reduction is not substantial, since spillover effects are clearly evident (detailed in the Notes to Table 2 ). The strength of the α 3 coefficient suggests that co-worker's education has a strong impact on own earnings; spillover effects are clearly apparent. As the average workplace has 45 employees, a co-worker's extra year of education is worth about 3.5% ((0.0935/45)/0.0588) of one's own education.
Model [4] is the full estimation specified as equation (1), to include the interaction between own and co-worker years of education. This interaction term has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. We find no support for the argument that own education is rewarded at a relatively higher rate in workplaces where education levels are already high. This result (α 4 <0) thus runs counter to the predictions of Idson and Kahane (2000) and Kremer (1993) . It suggests an intraworkplace competitive effect, rather than complementarity or increasing returns to scale of human capital. However, these relationships need to be tested further.
The effect of the spread of human capital is also reported in Table 2 . Two tests are applied. In Model [5] the square of workplace years of education is reported.
The coefficients on workplace education are positive, but for its square they are negative: workplace education boosts own earnings, but at a declining rate. In Model
[6] a direct measure of dispersion É j is included in place of the interaction term.
Adjusting for overall workforce human capital, greater dispersion of education across the workplace is associated with higher own earnings: a one standard deviation increase in dispersion raises own earnings by 4.1%. Both these tests seemingly contradict the hypothesis of increasing returns to skill in standardised workplaces;
Model [6] also raises skepticism about the importance of 'standards compatibility' and working together argument (at least insofar as working together is defined here).
Further investigation tests the hypotheses for sub-samples of interest. First, the sample is split across union and non-union workplaces. This split is interesting, because the results could go either way. Unions may facilitate the sharing of skills across workers, who then collectively bargain over pay. With facilitation, the probability of invidious competition between workers would be lower and so crossworkplace spillovers of human capital should be stronger. Yet, if unions instead demarcate skills and apportion tasks, this would reduce the opportunities for human capital spillovers. Model [4] as per Table 2 is re-estimated in Table 3 , split by union/non-union workplaces (the union is identified by having pay bargaining rights).
These estimations show that both the returns to own education and to co-worker education are substantially lower for union workplaces. Moreover, the interaction term e ij *E j is strongly significant and negative in non-union workplaces, but not so in union workplaces. These results also hold up if the sample is divided into union and non-union workers, rather than workplaces (details available from the authors).
These results suggest then that unions -by reducing the returns to education -play a demarcational role, rather than a skill-sharing one. Moreover, in non-union workplaces there is evidence that co-worker human capital is not complementary to own human capital. These are the types of workplaces where tournaments between workers are likely to be the strongest. Table 3 also reports estimations for workplaces where it might plausibly be expected that human capital spillovers would be the strongest: these are identified as workplaces where there is high team-working (i.e., workplaces where at least 60% of workers are reported to work in teams) and where the technology is labour-intensive (i.e., where labor accounts for more than 75% of operating costs). 6 Reducing the sample inflates the standard errors, and this generates some sensitivity across the results. However, there is no evidence that spillovers are greater in these workplaces, but neither is there support for the idea of human capital complementarity.
A series of tests for the robustness of the results in Table 2 were undertaken.
As well as the theory-driven restrictions on the sample reported in Table 3 , the estimation was respecified and alternative derivations of e i , E j and y ij were used.
A series of specification tests were undertaken. These tests included: OLS estimation for each specification; inclusion of occupational dummy variables for each individual; and application of the survey weights for the data. 7 In most cases, the results were unaffected; in some cases, the negative effect for the interaction term e i *E j was strengthened and in only one instance (male union sample, occupational dummies included) was a positive and statistically significant coefficient obtained.
6 Small firms may also rely more on human capital spillovers. When only firms of less than 40 workers are included, however, the interaction terms are all insignificant. 7 In particular, application of the weights does not materially alter the conclusions here. As the intention here is to investigate workplace interactions, rather than describe the UK economy, it is not necessary to use the weights.
The second set of sensitivity tests involved alternative derivations of the key dependent and independent variables e i , E j and y ij . First, workplace education levels E j were re-calculated, using two alternatives. One alternative was to use occupational averages of years of education from the 1998 UK Labour Force Survey, and then apply these to the occupational mix of each workplace. Another alternative was to take the simple average years of education across the workers from each workplace.
These re-calculations -described as E2 j and E3 j in Appendix Table 1 -have a higher spread and sampling error than E j used above. Nevertheless, they serve as a check on the results. 8 Second, the dispersion measure was calculated using squared dispersions rather than absolute dispersions (again, see Appendix Table 1 ). Finally, interval regression was applied to the log of annual earnings values (denoted y2 ij ), instead of log pay per hour y ij . 9 Across this sizeable set of tests, the coefficients represented in Tables 2-3 were largely unaffected. Finally, the sample was split by gender; again, the results are largely unaffected although the negative interaction term for males is now statistically significant (see Appendix Tables 2M and 2F ).
One further relevant estimation is possible to test for human capital spillovers using the WERS. The overall workplace wage level may be a better measure for capturing skills' complementarities than the individual salaries of randomly drawn workers (essentially, this is like the difference between a population versus a sample estimate). Therefore, the log median wage across each workplace Y j , as reported by the manager of the workplace, is used as the dependent variable. This log median wage is calculated from reports of the distribution of wages across the entire workplace (see Appendix Table 1 for details). However, wages are only reported in one of six wage bands, and the hourly rate of pay is not calculable, so workplace-level variables may have more measurement error than individual wages. Nevertheless, the estimation controls for a vector of workplace-level characteristics, with the key independent variables being derived from workplace education levels. Table 4 shows the strongly positive effect of the average education level on the median wage of the establishment. Increasing the average workforce education by 1.2 years (one standard deviation) raises the median workplace wage by 15.6%. This percentage is similar to the estimate of 11.3% reported in Table 2 for workplace education, noting that these earlier estimations control directly for own education. Model [B] shows the effect of the dispersion of education: a one standard deviation increase in dispersion raises median earnings by 1.4%. Again, these results are not sensitive to the weighting procedure or more parsimonious modelling. They cohere with the results reported above, and are contrary to the notion of human capital complementarities or the benefits of compatibility across workers.
Model [A] of
Conclusion
For the first time using British data this paper directly investigates the possibility that there are spillover effects of education within industrial workplaces. Spillover effects are found to positively influence own earnings, and these effects are largely
Hourly pay is not fully in intervals, because individuals reported the exact number of hours worked. Details are available from the authors.
independent of the effect from own education. However, the hypotheses that coworker education is most beneficial when it is either (a) accompanied by a uniform standard of education (the o-ring theory) or (b) in a workplace with higher education levels were also tested. Although the results were not fully consistent during sensitivity analysis, there is no evidence to support these hypotheses using either worker or workplace-level data.
The main result is nonetheless important: workplace education levels have a strong effect on own earnings, only slightly reducing the premium to own education.
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